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THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: VAN ORDEN,
MCCREARY, AND THE DANGERS OF
TRANSPARENCY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER *
INTRODUCTION
In this age of "sunshine," "transparency," and other celebrations
of open government, it is difficult to argue that critical aspects of
government decision-making should remain opaque and unrevealed.
Indeed, such a notion seems particularly indefensible when "the law," or
the rules articulated by government, is at issue. The law must give notice
of what it requires, and the reasons that it does so. The law must deal
with persons and situations consistently. The law must be rooted in
articulated principles, not arbitrariness or caprice.
Yet, I shall argue, there is at least one area of constitutional
jurisprudence where these generally unassailable truths falter. In this
area, transparency in rules and in the reasons for those rules is, in fact,
undesirable. Indeed, transparency may be dangerous, carrying unique
and hidden costs. This is the area dealing with the equal (or unequal)
treatment of religion by government.
For decades, the Establishment Clause' of the Constitution has
been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require the even-
handed treatment of religion and nonreligion by government. From the
"neutrality" prong of the longstanding Lemon test, z to the articulation of
* Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University. A prior version of this
essay was presented at the University of North Carolina School of Law on February
24, 2006.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . ").
2. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that a
challenged law must have a secular purpose; its primary effect must be "neutral" -
i.e., neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and it must not foster excessive
entanglement with religion).
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the more recent "endorsement" test,3 a foundational principle of the
Establishment Clause has been that government cannot "convey[] or
attempt[] to convey a message that religion [generally] or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred."4  This principle has been
motivated by the belief that for government to "choose" one religion
over another religion, or religion over non-religion, violates principles of
equality. All people-religious and nonreligious-will not be treated
equally by government if government "establishes" religion or
nonreligion generally, or one religion particularly, to the exclusion of
other points of view.
In practice, of course, this principle of equal treatment has often
been violated. The implementation of the idea that government cannot
establish one religion in preference to others (the "equality of sects") has
been relatively easy, at least in principle, when the religious nature of the
competing ideologies is something on which we can agree. Thus,
government cannot establish Protestantism to the exclusion of
Catholicism, or Judaism to the exclusion of Islam, and the idea that this
is a "Christian nation, 5 .is decidedly pass6. More difficult problems have
arisen when what are generally believed to be secular beliefs are
characterized as religious ones, 6 triggering claims that government's
3. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-50 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (government may not endorse religion or particular religious beliefs);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (suggesting that on
religious matters, government may not endorse a particular point of view).
4. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)) (alterations added). See
also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (the Establishment
Clause involves a "guarantee of neutrality"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
103-04 (1968) ("Government ... must be neutral in matters of religious theory,
doctrine, and practice."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(Government cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another.").
5. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)
(courtroom oaths, observance of the Sabbath by government, and "the churches and
church organizations which abound in every city, town and hamlet," establish that
"this is a Christian nation.").
6. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1l (1961) (stating that
religions in this country include "Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others").
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secular nature is, in fact, religious-sect favoritism, or when government's
secular nature is itself challenged as a violation of religion/non-religion
equal-treatment guarantees. 7  Claims of the last type are particularly
intractable, as a theoretical matter. Since government must necessarily
establish something-whether religious or nonreligious-through its
choices of principles and practices, equal treatment of religion and
nonreligion is, in this sense, impossible to achieve.
The governing majorities of the United States Supreme Court
have lived with these problems and contradictions for a long time-
repeating, as an obvious, foundational principle, that "[t]he First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion,"8 while ignoring (or
rationalizing) the extent to which secularism, monotheism, and Judeo-
Christian beliefs have been privileged and promoted by government. 9
The belief apparently has been that the prophylactic benefits of the
maintenance of the principle of absolutely equal treatment outweigh the
costs incurred in the revelation of its often fictitious nature. Even
dissenters, over the years, generally have been careful to skirt any direct
challenge to this principle or its sanctity.
7. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(considering a challenge to two exhibitions at the Smithsonian Museum of Natural
History, on the ground that. they established secular humanism in violation of Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause guarantees).
8. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (alteration added).
9. For instance, the imperative of equal treatment has been tempered by
assertions that religion should be "accommodated" by government, see, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding the state must accommodate
workers' Sabbath day practices), and that certain Judeo-Christian or monotheistic
practices by government are immunized by tradition or history. See, e.g., County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-03 (stating that legislative prayer, the national Motto ("In
God We Trust"), and religious references in the Pledge of Allegiance ("One Nation
Under God") are permissible as historical, "nonsectarian references to religion
by... government"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (finding that
certain government religious practices are permissible because they are "deeply
embedded in the history and tradition of this country").
2006]
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In Van Orden v. Perry'° and McCreary County v. ACLU, 1 both
decided in 2005, this tacit agreement ruptured. In these cases, which
dealt with the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays, two
blocks of justices emerged on the Court. The first block of justices-
what I shall call the "Neutralist Block"-insisted that the ideal of equal
treatment be retained. The second block of justices-what I shall call
the "Monotheist Block"--explicitly jettisoned the ideal of equal
treatment by government when it comes to religion-vs.-nonreligion, or
monotheism-vs.-non-monotheism, debates. In their view, we should
abandon the charade, and acknowledge that our government, historically
and currently, favors religion-particularly, monotheistic religion-over
other religious or nonreligious beliefs. For these justices, this favoritism
is both culturally understandable and eminently constitutional.
Beneath the obvious doctrinal differences in these approaches,
there is, I believe, a deep-and largely unarticulated-difference in
belief about the role that transparency should play in this area of law.
The Neutralist Block, I shall argue, does not seriously differ from the
Monotheist Block in most outcomes; for instance, the Neutralist Block
would undoubtedly uphold, for various reasons, almost all of the
monotheist practices in which state and federal governments currently
engage. The disagreement, in the main, is not whether particular
practices are "in" or "out"; it is whether constitutional law should
explicitly recognize and sanctify the promotion of religion-and
monotheistic religion, particularly-by government.
Does this matter? Does it matter whether our constitutional
scheme implicitly sanctions the favoring of monotheistic practices by
government-in the form of myriad "exceptions" to the equal treatment
rule-or that it explicitly does so? In these remarks, I shall argue that it
does. Although the Monotheist Block is correct in its assessment of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this area, transparently viewed,
there are excellent reasons why this area of law has remained cloaked in
opaqueness and obfuscation for so long. Furthermore, the transparency
10. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).
11. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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that the Monotheist Block advances would involve dangers and hidden
costs that we, as a religiously pluralistic society, should not wish to pay.
I. THE VAN ORDEN AND MCCREARYCASES
The Van Orden and McCreary cases might seem, in some ways,
to have been unlikely candidates for triggering an overt attack on the
long-standing principle of government religious neutrality. Government
posting of the Ten Commandments and other government engagement in
monotheistic, historical, or cultural religious exercise had long been
handled by conventional equal-treatment doctrine and its copious
exceptions as articulated by the Court. 2  It is true that in Stone v.
Graham,13 the posting of the Ten Commandments in a public-school
classroom was invalidated. However, under the traditional rules, public-
school settings have always been treated as arenas of particular
sensitivity, and numerous doctrinal avenues-such as the immunization
of the practice by history14 or the finding of secular legislative purpose or
context 5 -were available to the Van Orden and McCreary displays'
supporters on the Court.
Van Orden involved a challenge to a Ten Commandments
monument placed by a civic group on the Texas State Capitol grounds in
1961. The civic organization paid the cost of erecting the monument,
although it was done with the approval of the state legislature. 6 The
12. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-03 (distinguishing
legislative prayer, the national motto ("In God We Trust"), and religious references
in the Pledge of Allegiance ("One Nation Under God") from prohibited practices,
because they are historical, "nonsectarian references to religion by the
government"); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-90 (holding that nonsectarian legislative
prayer had historical and civic, not predominantly religious, meaning).
13. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
14. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-92 (upholding legislative prayer as
"deeply embedded in... history and tradition").
15. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (articulating the
"secular purpose" test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1984) (holding
that inclusion of a creche in a town holiday display was not, in that context, the use
of a religious symbol to endorse religion).
16. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005).
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monument is large-measuring six feet high and three feet wide-and
sits on grounds that cover twenty-two acres.' 7 There are sixteen other
monuments and twenty-one historical markers on the grounds,
"commemorating the 'people, ideals, and events that compose Texan
identity.""'
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court,
upholding the monument's constitutionality, and delivered a plurality
opinion in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. The Ten
Commandments, Rehnquist wrote, "are religious-they were so viewed
at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious• .,-- ,,19
significance. However, "[s]imply having religious content or
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause., 20 "Our institutions presuppose [the
existence of] a Supreme Being . ,,21 Government institutions cannot• . ,,22
"press religious observances upon their citizens. However,
government need not and cannot "evince a hostility to religion" by
refusing to recognize "our religious heritage" and the needs of religious
23
groups.
As for the equal-treatment principle itself, Rehnquist described
this in terms that echo the more strident articulation of the views of the
24Monotheist Block in the McCreary case. Despite what equal treatment
might appear to guarantee, "we have not, and do not, adhere to the
principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental
preference for religion over irreligion."25 "Recognition of the role of
God in our Nation's heritage has.., been reflected in our decisions. We
have acknowledged, for example, that 'religion has been closely
17. See id.
18. Id. (quoting Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001)).
19. Id. at 2863.
20. Id. (citations omitted) (alteration added).
21. Id. at 2859 (alteration added).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). See discussion infra
pp. 67-71.
25. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860 n.3 (citations omitted).
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identified with our history and government .... ,,,26 Indeed, even the
dissenters in this case "do not claim that the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses forbid all governmental acknowledgments, preferences, or
accommodations of religion.' '27 Neutrality-even if required--does not
prevent this.
In this case, Rehnquist wrote, the monument is "passive, ' 28
pressuring no passerby to adhere to its message. It has not been placed
in a particularly sensitive context, such as elementary and secondary
schools. 29 Although the Ten Commandments are a religious text, in this
display they have "a dual significance, partaking of both religion and
government., 30  As such, this monument presents no violation of the
Establishment Clause. 3'
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but declined to
endorse the plurality's implicit discard of the equal-treatment test. In his
view, "neutrality" is the governing principle, although the
implementation of this idea may be complex. 32 Whether a challenged
government action is "neutral," and constitutional, depends upon its
"context and consequences measured in light of [the Establishment
Clause's] . . . purposes., 33  In Breyer's view, where-as here-the
monument's history reflects no particular religious objective by
government, and where it "has stood apparently uncontested for nearly
two generations, 34 the requirement of practical government neutrality
has not been violated. Indeed, removal of the monument after so many
years could have exactly the opposite effect to that desired: it
"could ... create the very kind of religiously-based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.,
35
26. Id. at 2861-62 (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963)).
27. Id. at 2860 n.3 (plurality opinion) (characterizing the argument of the
dissenting opinion).
28. See id. at 2861, 2864.
29. See id. at 2863-64.
30. Id. at 2864.
31. See id.
32. See id at 2868-72 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration added).
34. Id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The dissenters in Van Orden-Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
Souter, and O'Connor-staked their ground on a reaffirmation of the
need for the equal-treatment test.36 In their view, "the Establishment
Clause demands religious neutrality"37-and this means no privilege for
religion over nonreligion, or for particular religions over others.
38
Government may acknowledge the religious beliefs and practices of the
American people, and preserve works of art or historic memorabilia that
reflect religious themes. 39 Individual government actors may share their
personal views, and express their personal religious beliefs.40  "A
governmental display of an obviously religious text . . . [may be
permissible] in a setting that plausibly indicates that the statement is not
placed in view with a predominant purpose on the part of government
either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by
others.",4' However, government may not endorse religion generally, or
Judeo-Christian principles particularly, in its policies, pronouncements,
42or practices.
Evaluated against this backdrop, this Commandments
monument, in the dissenters' view, clearly fails. It states unequivocally
that "there is one, and only one, God., 43  The "official state
endorsement" of this message "is flatly inconsistent" with our nation's
"resolute commitment to neutrality. '"44 In short,
Recognizing the diversity of religious and secular
beliefs held by Texans and by all Americans, it
seems beyond peradventure that allowing the seat
of government to serve as a stage for the
propagation of an unmistakably Judeo-Christian
36. See id. at 2873-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2891 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2892-97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 2875, 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2892, 2897 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
39. See id. at 2876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 2883 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
42. See id. at 2880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5
message of piety would have the tendency to make
nonmonotheists and nonbelievers "feel like
[outsiders] in matters of faith, and [strangers] in the
political community. 45
For these justices, there was no doubt but that this monument violates the
Establishment Clause.
The McCreary case trod much of the same ground, although it
was an arguably more egregious situation. In 1999, the executives of
two counties in Kentucky posted large copies of an abridged text of the
46
King James version of the Ten Commandments in county courthouses.
In response to a lawsuit brought by the ACLU, the displays were
expanded to include excerpts from other public documents, such as the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution of
Kentucky.47 All of these documents contained references to God, the
48
Bible, and other religious themes. After a preliminary injunction was
49
issued by a federal district judge, the displays were changed again.
This time, they consisted of nine framed documents, including the Ten
Commandments, the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the
Bill of Rights, and the Mayflower Compact. 5° The collection was
entitled "The Foundations of American Law and Government Display.
' 5'
In this case, the dispositional roles of the Neutralist Block and
the Monotheist Block were reversed. Because Justice Breyer joined the
result urged by the Neutralist Block, these displays were struck down.
The Monotheist justices who comprised the plurality in Van Orden were
left-in McCreary--to dissent.
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began with a reiteration
of the principle "that the 'First Amendment mandates governmental
45. Id. at 2881 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(alterations in original).
46. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005).
47. Id. at 2729-30.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2730.
50. Id.
51. Id. at2730-31.
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neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and.. • ,,,52
nonreligion. Furthermore, when determining whether neutrality is
breached, the government's purpose is a critical inquiry.53 "When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates -that central Establishment Clause value of
official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the
government's ostensible object is to take sides. 5 4  "Manifesting a
purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence to religion
generally, 55 "sends [a] .. .message to . 'nonadherents that they are
outsiders"'' 56 and "clashes with 'the understanding ...that liberty and
social stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious
views of all citizens . . ,,57
In this case, the majority held, a religious purpose permeated allS• 58
three displays. The Ten Commandments are clearly religious. They
are "a central point of reference in the religious and moral history of
Jews and Christians. They proclaim the existence of a monotheistic
god .... They regulate details of religious obligation . . . . The
original display, comprised of the Commandments alone, was "an
unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious obligations and
with morality subject to religious sanction. When government initiates
an effort to place this statement alone in public view, a religious object is
unmistakable. 6 °  Nor did the second or third display "cure" this61
purpose. The religious purpose of the second display, whose
documents were united by the sole common element of religious
52. Id. at 2733 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
53. See id. at 2734-35 (reiterating the importance of the government's purpose
as part of the Establishment Clause inquiry).
54. Id. at 2733.
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-310
(2000)) (alteration added).
57. Id. (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
58. See id. at 2727-45.
59. Id. at 2738.
60. Id. at 2739.
61. See id at 2739-40.
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references, was obvious.62 The third display, "which quoted more of the
purely religious language of the Commandments than the first two
displays had done," perpetuated this objective.63  "No reasonable
observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the
objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays."
64
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent for Justices Rehnquist, Thomas,
and Kennedy (in part), set forth a starkly different vision. Citing
evidence of the religious and monotheistic assumptions of both Founding
Era figures and many contemporary government practices, he asked,
"how can the Court possibly assert that 'the First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between.., religion and nonreligion,' . .. and
that '[m]anifesting a purpose to favor . . . adherence to religion
generally' . . . is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words
of the Constitution. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our
society's constant understanding of those words. Surely not even the
current sense of our society," in view of our perpetuation of religious
references in government documents and symbols.
65
Indeed, Justice Scalia argued, "[w]hat distinguishes the rule of
law from the dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court majority is the
absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded
in consistently applied principle." 66  To trumpet the principle of
neutrality-and then to carve, from this principle, a myriad of
exceptions-erodes public trust in the rule of law. "[A]n enforced
neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and current
practice ... [risks] losing all that sustains it: the willingness of the people
to accept [the Court's] ... interpretation of the Constitution as definitive,




63. Id. at 2740.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
66. Id. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations added).
67. Id. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
2006]
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The unavoidable conclusion, Scalia wrote, is that the asserted
rule that government cannot favor religion over nonreligion is
"demonstrably false." 68  In fact, government-with the Court's
blessing-aids religion (in tax exemptions, in exemptions from religious-
discrimination-in-employment provisions and in other ways), protects the
free exercise of religion, and publicly acknowledges the Creator and
citizens' religious beliefs.69  Nor is the other tenet of "religious
neutrality"--that government cannot favor one religious belief over
another-any more realistic:
If religion in the public forum had to be entirely
nondenominational, there could be no religion in
the public forum at all. One cannot say the word
"God," or "the Almighty," one cannot offer public
supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting
the beliefs of some people that there are many
gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention to
70human affairs.
Indeed, Scalia argued, monotheism-as exhibited by
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-accounts for 97.7% of all religious
believers in the United States. 7' For practical reasons if f'or no other, "the
Establishment Clause permits... disregard of polytheists and believers
in unconcerned deities" by government in its acknowledgments of
72American religious life.
This part of Scalia's dissent-the conceptual heart of the
Monotheist Block-was joined by Rehnquist and Thomas. Kennedy
joined other parts, which declared that the majority was wrong even if
the pertinent inquiry were the "purpose" prong of the traditional Lemon
test.
73
The Neutralist Block responded to Scalia's challenges in its
majority opinion. Souter acknowledged that their approach did not
68. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 2751-52. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2752-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 2757-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5
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provide "an elegant interpretative rule to draw the line in all of the
multifarious situations" where government involvement with religion is
74presented. Indeed, "given its generality as a principle, an appeal to
neutrality alone cannot possibly lay every issue to rest, or tell us what
issues on the margins are substantial enough for constitutional
significance . . ,7" This principle, like others, can only provide a
"sense of direction"; 76 beyond this, one must consider the context in
which the government action occurs, and the purposes of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.77 Those purposes include not only
the integrity of individual conscience, but the prevention of "the civic
divisiveness that follows" when government takes sides in religious
debates.78
Thus, taking Van Orden and McCreary together, the views of the
Monotheist Block and the Neutralist Block can be summarized as
follows:
For the Monotheist Block (Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, and to
some extent Kennedy):
Religion and religious traditions have played a strong role
throughout our Nation's history. In particular, there is a rich and
continuing tradition of the acknowledgement of the Creator/One
God/the Almighty by government. We are a religious people.
Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. Any case
regarding religious references and religious displays by
government must be decided against this background.
" Government can purposely engage in the acknowledgment,
preference, accommodation, even assistance of religion in this
monotheistic sense. If monotheistic references-if
acknowledgment of the Creator by government-are simply
offered, that is acceptable. Government cannot actively
74. Id. at 2742.
75. Id. at 2743.
76. Id. at 2742.
77. See id at 2742-43.
78. See id. at 2742.
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intervene in religious matters. It cannot require religious
observances of its citizens. It cannot engage in coercion-it
cannot press people to act or agree. It can acknowledge the
monotheistic beliefs of the vast majority of Americans.
" It is true that this favors religion (particularly monotheistic
religion) over other beliefs. It is true that this discriminates, in
turn, against polytheists, believers in unconcerned deities, and
atheists.
" However, discrimination in this context is unavoidable.
Government "neutrality" in this context is impossible. We face,
in fact, an irreducible choice: allowing government recognition
of religion ("favoring" monotheistic religion), or preventing
government recognition of religion ("suppressing" or "hostility
to" monotheistic religion). Given this choice, we choose the
former. Suppression of religious acknowledgment would be
acquiescence to the wishes of atheists/non-monotheists-itself, a
substantive position by government. Making this choice would
deny the reality of American history and American life.
* Other groups are protected by free exercise, non-disparagement,
and non-proselytization guarantees.
" Within monotheism, endorsement of a particular religious
viewpoint by government is prohibited. However, this refers to
choices among monotheists themselves. It does not refer to a
general, monotheistic choice.
For the Neutralist Block (Souter, Ginsberg, O'Connor, and
Breyer):
As an official matter, government must remain neutral between
religion and nonreligion, and between religion and religion.
There is no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is
to take sides in any of these disputes.
[Vol. 5
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" To allow government to intentionally or purposely espouse
monotheism means that government is free to approve the core
beliefs of a favored religion over the tenets of others. This the
government cannot do. It cannot have an expressed preference
for monotheism over other religious or nonreligious beliefs.
" For government to violate this principle of neutrality is to make
some citizens feel like outsiders. The increasing diversity of the
population underscores the need for government neutrality in
religious matters, but the principle transcends this. Government
cannot convey the message that some are outsiders, whatever
their percentage of the population may be.
" The critical issue is government preference, endorsement,
exclusion, and the potential for divisiveness. Statements made
by government leaders and actions by government that do not
convey these meanings or carry this risk are not prohibited (e.g.,
expressions of personal views by political leaders, historical
practices and monuments clearly' recognized by the reasonable
observer as such, and so on). Those that do convey these
meanings or carry these risks are prohibited.
The ways in which these positions differ, as stated, are obvious.
Indeed, the gulf between these positions is illustrated by the outcomes in
the Van Orden and McCreary cases. The existence of a prominent
statement of Judaic and Christian religious and moral principles on the
buildings or grounds of state or local government, whether placed by a
civic group (with government's blessing) or by government itself, is
acceptable to the Monotheists and unacceptable to the Neutralists. For
the Monotheists, such a display is simply an acknowledgment of
Americans' religiosity. For the Neutralists, it is a forbidden endorsement
of religion by government.
Indeed, the abandonment of even a rhetorical fig leaf of
neutrality by the Monotheist Block is a startling development in First
Amendment jurisprudence. For decades, the Court has retained as
bedrock principle the idea that government must maintain neutrality
between religion and nonreligion, and between religious sects. This has
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been maintained even as it has been contradicted by the apparent
promotion of monotheism by government (e.g., under the guise of
"historical practice" 79), special preferences afforded to religion (e.g., tax
exemptions, free-exercise guarantees, and so on), and the special
disabilities under which religion has been placed (non-establishment
guarantees). To be sure, the Monotheist Block carefully notes that
neutrality between religion and nonreligion is still a valid principle where
public aid or assistance (presumably, financial assistance) to religion is
concerned.80 However, its abandonment in other contexts seems
stunningly wide. If government is free to
"disregard . . . polytheists, . . . believers in unconcerned deities,
[and] ... devout atheists," 81 what may government now do? May it call
upon "God," "the Creator," or "the Almighty" in any government
proclamation or other document? May it conduct monotheistic prayer at
any public gathering (exempting, of course, the special case of public
schools 82)? May it emblazon Old Testament scriptures (or other
"monotheistic" documents) on every government administrative building
and courthouse facade?
As this parade of possibilities illustrates, there is surely a range
of practices that the Monotheist Block's principles would permit and that
traditional, Neutralist principles would not. However, what is also
stunning about this list is the extent to which it simply reiterates what
American federal, state, and (often) local governments already do. We
already have pervasive government expressions-and implicit
endorsements-of "God," "the Creator," and "the Almighty" in
government proclamations, symbols, and documents. We already have
monotheistic prayer in legislative assemblies and other government fora.
We already have references to "our Judeo-Christian heritage" in statute-
creation and case-deciding. We already, de facto, largely ignore the
views of "polytheists, believers in unconcerned deities,
[and] ... atheists. 83  If we are honest with ourselves about current
practices, we must admit that the Monotheist Block is, in fact, at least
79. See id. at 2749-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
82. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863-64 (2005).
83. 'McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
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substantially correct. Religion is-in a monotheistic sense-already
"chosen," acknowledged, preferred, and assisted by American
government. For the vast majority of situations, the principles urged by
the Monotheist Block would not radically alter the outcome; they would
simply end the "Neutralist charade."
Should we, then, simply jettison "neutrality," as the Monotheists
urge? Is there any reason why we, as a society and government, should
perpetuate the idea of neutrality, even as we know that we will-
overwhelmingly-honor it only in the breach?
II. THE DANGERS OF TRANSPARENCY
Generally, the idea that we should face what we are doing and
align the principles of law with actual practice seems unassailable. If we
have, in fact, a religion-privileging, monotheistic government, and if we
have no intention of changing that character, concerns for the integrity of
law (as Scalia argues) would require that we align the law to reflect this
reality.
However, let us consider this apparently obvious proposition
more critically. To begin, is transparency-in this sense-what we
routinely implement? When actual practice (for whatever reason)
conflicts with deeply held principle, do we modify or jettison the
principle to reflect this truth?
Let us take, for instance, one of the most fundamental principles
underlying our culture, public policymaking, and government: that "life
is a pearl beyond price." The idea that human life is priceless, and that it
should be protected at all cost, is something with which few citizens,
politicians, or judges would disagree. In service of this sacred principle,
we pull out all of the stops to rescue mountain climbers caught in storms
and miners trapped in underground explosions. We keep people alive for
months or years in hospitals on costly machines and convulse, as a
society, when a publicized decision is made to terminate treatment. We
agonize over the fact that someone in another country is starving, or that
an innocent man in this country might be executed. In every setting and
in every act, we vindicate the foundational belief that life is a pearl
beyond price.
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At the same time, of course-in practice-we systematically and
legally subvert this principle. There is no legal right to prescription
drugs, or medical specialists, or costly interventionist procedures; there is
no legal claim that a destitute foreigner can mount to our food, clothing,
or shelter; and we haggle over whether society or law owes to men on
death row a DNA test that might clear them. We find, in short, that the
principle of life's pricelessness is riddled with "exceptions" in practice.
Despite our feel-good moments of rescues, wrenching hospital stories,
and foreign children flown to the United States for food and medical
care, our principle of sanctity of life is honored-in part, nationally, and
surely, globally-more often in the breach.
Why, then, do we cling to the absolute statement of this
principle? Why don't we recognize, transparently, this charade?
In a classic work published almost thirty years ago,84 Guido
Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt explored this question. The core issue,
considered in this book, is how and why society allocates tragically
scarce resources, such as vaccines, dialysis machines, draft exemptions,
and immigration permissions. The choosing may be by design, or by
default (that is, from other, independent actions); in either case, for the
chosen, the result is the same. Society-for reasons of true physical
limitation, or (more likely) costs or unwillingness to forego other goods
or benefits-makes decisions of who shall live, and who shall die.85
The idea that such a "tragic choice" exists, and is being made-
that certain people must suffer or die, because of society's other
86(conscious) choices-contradicts the postulate that life is priceless. To
explicitly face this truth would be to arouse terror and outrage, anger and
violence. (Consider, for instance, the outrage that always accompanies
the idea that medical care for the poor should be rationed, or the violence
that occurred when supplies of vaccines for children in a recent
meningitis outbreak were acknowledged to be short). Thus, we engage
in methods that allow us to make the allocation without acknowledging
our role in the creation of the tragic choice. Domestic access to health
care becomes a question of "worthiness" (e.g., employment status or
84. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIPBOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
85. See id. at 17-22.
86. See id. at 19.
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personal financial resources); selection of a foreigner for food, life-
saving medicine or asylum becomes a question of perseverance (e.g., a
market in time, or political sophistication, or literacy), or a matter of fate
(e.g., discovery by an American soldier or aid worker); and so on.87
In short, we recognize that the maintenance of often fictitious
principle in the face of contrary practice may serve important-indeed,
critical-cultural, societal, and legal goals. There are costs to our moral
and social fabric if we explicitly acknowledge that life-saving food,
shelter, and protection are a question of money or other calculated
choice. There are costs, in this context, that are incurred in the pursuit of
honesty and transparency-costs for our maintenance of a critical moral
value, costs for our confidence in government, costs for our willingness
to accept the outcome of the tragic choice itself.
Similarly, there are costs in the seemingly simple pursuit of
honesty and transparency in our treatment of the principle of state
religious neutrality. There are cultural, societal, and legal costs in the
move from a "dishonest" proclamation of government neutrality to an
"honest" proclamation that neutrality in government practices and
principles does not exist.
First, there are costs to the value of aspiration. Few moral or
legal principles are observed with anything resembling complete
consistency in practice. We believe, for instance, in the ideal of the right
to counsel, yet we restrict this right to certain procedures, and are
reluctant to commit the resources necessary to ensure the counsel's
competence. We believe in the right to free speech, yet, of necessity,
there are myriad exceptions for fighting words, libel, hate speech, and
others. We believe in the right to due process of law, but this concept in
practice is an elastic one that affords little in many contexts.
Yet--despite these "hypocrisies"-we would never consider
abandoning these principles or ideals that they represent. The reason is
that these principles establish our aspirations, albeit imperfectly. They
establish societal and legal ideals toward which we believe that we must
strive, even as resource limitations, practical considerations, and our own
conflicting material and ideological goals prevent their attainment. They
87. See id. at 72-78, 92-98, 195-99.
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force us to justify deviation or neglect. They hold our collective feet to
the "principled" fire.
The principle of government neutrality in religious matters, as
imperfect in practice as it is, is similar in its aspirational qualities and
justificatory demands. There is, in fact, a vast difference between
declaration of a principle that government must be neutral between
religion and nonreligion, and religion and religion-and a declaration
that our government favors religious institutions and practices of a
monotheistic or "Abrahamic" kind. This is true even though we now
refer to a monotheistic God in government proclamations, art, symbols,
and policies. There is a difference between a neutrality that is highly
valued, but sometimes breached-and a theocratic declaration. These
differences inhere in the presumptions that we bring to legal questions,
and the way that we, as a society, view transgressions. There is a
difference in the culture of goals, attitudes, and boundaries that we
encourage and create. There is a difference in our acts, our aspirations,
and our sense of self.
Consider, for instance, the following story, recently reported in
The New York Times.88 A woman, Mona Dobrich, grew up as the only
Jew in school in Georgetown, Delaware. 89 As an adult, she "married a
local man, bought the house behind her parents' home and brought up
her two children as Jews. For years, she and [her children] ... listened
to Christian prayers at public school potlucks, award dinners and parent-
teacher group meetings .... ,90 However, it was a minister's prayer at
her daughter's high school graduation-which proclaimed Jesus as the
only way to truth-that caused her to act.91 "'It was as if no matter how
much hard work, no matter how good a person you are, the only way
you'll ever be anything is through Jesus Christ,' Mrs. Dobrich said."
92
"After the graduation, Mrs. Dobrich asked the [school district] to
consider prayers that were more generic and . . .less exclusionary.
' 93
88. Neela Banerjee, Families Challenging Religious Influence in Delaware
Schools, N. Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2006, at AlO.
89. See id.
90. Id. (alteration added).
91. See id
92. Id.
93. Id. (alteration added).
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The response by local residents included "[a]nger [that] spilled out on to
talk radio, in letters to the editor [of local papers], and at school board
meetings attended by hundreds of people., 94 "After receiving several
threats, Mrs. Dobrich took her son.., to Wilmington in the fall of 2004,
planning to stay until the controversy blew over. It never has." 95
The Dobriches later sued the school district, "joined by 'the
Does,' a family still in the school district who have remained anonymous
because of the response against the Dobriches. Meanwhile, a Muslim
family in another school district [in the same county] has filed suit,
alleging proselytizing in the schools and the harassment of their
,,96daughters. The Times article continued, "[t]he Dobrich and Doe legal
complaint portrays a district in which children were given special
privileges for being in Bible club, Bibles were distributed in 2003 at an
elementary school, Christian prayer was routine at school functions and
teachers evangelized. 97  Rev. Jerry Fike, the minister who gave the
graduation speech described above, explained his actions this way:
"'Because Jesus Christ is my Lord and Savior, I will speak out for
him' .... 'The Bible encourages that. Ultimately, He is the one I have
to please.'"8s
Now, to be fair, this kind of merger of religion and state would
almost certainly be unacceptable to the justices of the Monotheist Block,
as it surely would be to those who are members of the Neutralist Block.
In their opinions, the Monotheist justices were strong and consistent in
their positions that government endorsement of one monotheistic sect
(Christianity) over other monotheistic sects (Judaism and Islam) is
unacceptable, particularly in the public schools. 99 Thus, we can certainly
assume that none of them would in any way condone the school district's
practices here.
However, this story is evocative of our question in the following
sense. What if-instead of a school graduation speech-the setting was
a civic gathering or a courthouse entryway? What if-instead of
94. Id. (alterations added).
95. Id.
96. See id. (alteration added).
97. Id. (alteration added).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854. 2863-64 (2005).
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Christianity-the religion that was touted as superior to all others was
"the Monotheist tradition," or "the great Abrahamic faiths"?
Furthermore, what if such touting or proselytizing was explicitly
permitted-and, thus, implicitly endorsed-to the exclusion of all other
religious (or nonreligious) beliefs by government?
It is obvious that this would have legal and cultural ramifications
beyond the neutrality-with-exceptions principle under which we have
lived. The overt preference for monotheism or "Abrahamic" religions
which this government endorsement exhibits would eliminate any need
for legal justification, inter-religious sensitivity, or cultural restraint.
Those who hold monotheistic or "Abrahamic" views would not only be
permitted to fuse their particular beliefs and practices with government-
they would be endowed with a mantle of justified and state-sanctioned
superiority (over Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Taoists, others) while doing so.
This points out the other great cost in the discard of the principle
of government neutrality: the cost to efforts in collective understanding.
The principle of neutrality, whatever its flaws in operation, sends a
powerful message to "outsiders." That message is: We are aware of your
plight. To the "Dobriches" who are Hindus, Jains, Taoists, or atheists,
the principle of neutrality says: We (the majority) are aware of you.
Your struggles and pain are not invisible. We acknowledge-by the
principle of neutrality-that our government and culture must strive to be
inclusive, and reject what is disparaging or offensive. And-toward that
end-you have legal rights.
CONCLUSION
Human affairs and human institutions are rarely perfect. Indeed,
considering the fractious, self-important, and self-interested nature of the
human animal, it is perhaps a wonder that as much harmony, shared
aspirations, and inter-human understanding as we experience, in fact
exists. In evaluating our carefully constructed social and legal landscape,
and in considering radical changes in principle, we must be cautious.
The idea that law should mirror practice, and that we should
transparently confront our actions, has much to commend it. However,
we must remember that with articulated, embraced, and celebrated
abandonment of principle, may come steep costs. Sometimes there are
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reasons why principle has been, and should be, sustained in the face of
its acknowledged practical failures. Sometimes, in a heady rush toward
transparency, we forget what it might mean to have no principle at all.
